[Editor's Note: The author suggests that the universal sorrow of AIDS stands as a metaphor for other forms of suffering and raises distinctive theological questions on the meaning of hope, God's involvement in evil, and how God's empathy can be experienced in the mystery of disease. As an expression of radical realism and hope, Rahner's theology helps us find in the sorrow of AIDS an opening into the mystery of God.] 
wound as from its original source
What we avoid when we turn away from [the outcasts] is the original wound we have buried as deeply as we can inside ourselves. The joy of the saints comes from reopening it. industrially developed countries, by the year 2000 there will be a minimum of 38 million, and perhaps as many as 60 to 70 million infected adults. Those most vulnerable are the very poor, especially women and children in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where the disease is spreading in plague-like algorithms. 4 Given the sheer numbers, AIDS commands our theological attention.
Second, AIDS has a kind of metaphorical quality. It is unique as a new disease, but as a form of human suffering it can shed new light on our approach to other human calamities. This point, first made brilliantly by Susan Sontag, 5 was recently further developed in an MITsponsored study:
All illnesses are metaphors. They absorb and radiate the personalities and social conditions of those who experience symptoms and treatments. Only a few illnesses, however, carry such cultural salience that they become icons of the times. Like tuberculosis in fin de siècle Europe, like cancer in the first half of the American century, and like leprosy from Leviticus to the present, AIDS speaks of the menace and losses of the times. It marks the sick person, encasing the afflicted in an exoskeleton of peculiarly powerful meanings: the terror of a lingering and untimely death, the panic of contagion, the guilt of "selfearned illness." 6 Given its metaphorical quality, many of the questions AIDS raises have broad reach beyond AIDS itself; they may extend to other forms of human sorrow that afflict individual persons and implicate entire communities and societies. What we say about AIDS within the context of theology may have implications beyond AIDS, and possibly even for theology.
Third, AIDS, among all diseases, has been singled out by the Catholic Church, from the Vatican AIDS Conference to the efforts of local churches, in a concerted call to compassion. 7 this response is surely the fact that there come together in AIDS a number of inescapable factors: a congruence of changing patterns of sexuality (both homosexual and heterosexual), of religiously and socially proscribed behaviors or practices such as homosexual intercourse and drug usage, and of suffering and terminal disease on a massive scale, especially among the legions of hidden poor. When AIDS arrived with slamming force upon the world around 1981, it was immediately clear that this disease would pose a challenge to some established paradigms in Catholic theology, at least in moral theology, by virtue of its very newness and complexity. 8 More than other diseases, AIDS links sexuality, appetite, disease, guilt, shame, suffering, and death in ways that only grow more complex when we factor them into the complex realities of poverty, race, gender, class, culture, and religion-all projected onto a universal map. Like death itself, AIDS asks not only for the Church's pastoral response, but also for our theological attention, in order to plumb this reality for intelligibility within the context of faith.
Remarkably, especially in light of the Catholic Church's own attention to AIDS, systematic theologians have hardly begun to address the many questions and issues it raises. Though theologians have grappled courageously with the Holocaust, social and economic injustice especially in poor countries, and the changing patterns of gender relations and identity in society and Church, the complex reality of AIDS has not yet produced a comparable theological yield. While there have been significant works in spirituality, pastoral theology, and on specific issues in moral theology, 9 there has been little response from Catholic systematic theology. Yet should we not reexamine the theological tradition that now offers us a reflective context for our discussion of dations for an effective pastoral response, or is that pastoral response taking place alongside a theological tradition that cannot handle the complexity of this disease? I pose these questions because the Catholic Church's own call for a compassionate pastoral response to AIDS is honest only if we approach AIDS as a reality that speaks to our faith and our understanding of it. Hence, we are compelled to approach AIDS within the theological terrain of faith, rather than relegate it to the realm of spirituality or pastoral practice alone, as if it had nothing substantial to contribute to the understanding of faith in Jesus Christ. A professed compassion that does not issue from and lead to a deeper penetration of the empathy of Jesus constitutes a deficient form of Christian compassion. Jesus' empathy, which led him to enter the worlds of those outcasts for whom he showed compassion, even to the point of joining them, was a path to God.
Indeed, it seems obvious even to the casual observer that AIDS raises the mystery of God. AIDS presses properly theological questions upon which the integrity of pastoral strategy finally stands. As with all calamitous evils, AIDS puts God into question. More precisely, it asks: What does it mean to hope in God in the midst of seeming hopelessness, without denying the utter darkness of the sorrow of AIDS? Further, where is God to be found in the AIDS darkness? Is God somehow the cause of so much evil? Does so much evil represent, in some sense, God's judgment? Correlatively: How does God relate to those who actually suffer from this disease? Does the God who shows divine empathy in Jesus actually suffer? And finally: How can our answers to these theological questions ground a compassionate pastoral response that issues from faith and does not simply stand alongside it? I will attempt a theological approach to these questions in five parts: First, there is some need to explain the unusual expression, "Christian pessimism," which sets the context for what follows. Second, in light of Karl Rahner's theology of the cross, I inquire into the meaning of hope in God within a situation of darkness, especially the darkness of death. Third, I explore the place of God in relation to so much darkness, the issue of evil and providence. Fourth, I inquire into God's relation to the sufferer and I ask how the notion of divine empathy in the midst of darkness can theologically ground the compassion that the Church counsels. Finally, I suggest further theological challenges posed by AIDS.
CHRISTIAN PESSIMISM
It would be a mistake to presume that Rahner's Christian pessimism is a theological expression of morbidity. Rahner's own delight in the joys of life is well known and is lyrically expressed in many of his writings. Rahner was first of all a Christian, one who believed that where sin abounds, there grace abounds yet more (Romans 5:21). In his own words, "Christianity is a message of joy, courage, and unshakable confidence." 11 Nevertheless, the term "Christian pessimism" springs from Rahner's own pen. What does it mean?
In a short address entitled "Christian Pessimism," delivered in Frankfurt on November 10, 1983, Rahner described our human predicament as one of "radical perplexity." 12 Taking his cue from 2 Corinthians 4:8-10 ("we are perplexed, but not driven to despair''), Rahner argued that perplexity is a permanent existential, a given fact, of human life. It does not force us to despair, but as a permanent existential it will not be overcome within the span of human life. It will only be overcome within the ambit of God's provident mercy, the fulfillment of which takes place in God's future, in the eschaton.
In After this preliminary sketch, I now focus briefly on three dimensions of Christian pessimism that pertain to the present project: its radical realism about the darkness of life, its roots in the doctrine of sin, and its acceptance of the moral ambiguity of the human condition.
Realism
Rahner wrote that a Christian is "a person who accepts without reservations the whole of concrete human life with all of its adventures, its absurdities, and its incomprehensibilities." 16 The Christian is called upon to accept reality as it is rather than to evade it through a false religious piety. One must face squarely and with appropriate humiliation the stark reality of sin-one's own, and the world's-and ultimately the reality of suffering and death that are, at least indirectly, the tragic consequences of sin. Human freedom is actualized in the context of a profound acceptance of self and of reality, "without leaving anything out, and without closing oneself to the totality of what in the ultimate depths of reality is inescapably imposed upon humankind as a task."
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In adopting this realism, we discover that there is much that people 15 This idea is developed in some of Rahner's later essays. In one of his darkest writings, he muses: "There still echoes in our ears the triumphant cry of a humanity that once thought itself on the brink of self-created fulfillment. Now, however, we feel that we do not really know any more, that all our ideals are rapidly wearing thin, that everything is dissonance, that all our ideals and programs are pitifully impotent in the face of an ever-increasing hopelessness" (Rahner, "Utopia and Reality," Theology Digest 32 [1985] 139-44, at 143). In this essay, Rahner spoke with increasing frequency of the inevitable disappointment and bitterness of life, of disappointment as a basic mood of our existence: "As a result, whether as Christians or as human beings, we have no reason to be particularly optimistic. To be honest, I believe we are living in a wintry time for society and the church.... As Christians we should not try to spare ourselves failure, disappointment, and ruin with the ideological sweeteners being peddled in society and the church" (ibid). And he referred more frequently to the failure of the body in illness as a prelude to death; see his "Christian Dying," in Theological Investigations 18, trans. Edmund Quinn (New York: Crossroad, 1983) 230-34. 16 Foundations 402; the translation has been slightly emended for inclusive language. 17 Ibid. cannot change; recognizing this fact seriously shapes their future. Rahner used the dramatic metaphor of "imprisonment" to describe much of human existence. By this he did not imply the final inescapability of certain conditions of life, entrapment, nor a definitive personal surrender to the hopelessness of our predicament, despair, but rather the sheer force of our inherited objective reality through which we exercise our freedom and actualize ourselves as persons: our gender, constitution, orientations, cultures, intelligence, imagination, etc. None of these factors is finally determinative of our freedom, but, by the same token, none is completely under our final control. Hope is found from within these imprisonments, since as Rahner wrote, a "Christian believes that there is a path to freedom which lies in going through this imprisonment." 18 This freedom is gained not simply by endurance or sheer will power in overcoming obstacles. He insisted, "We do not seize it by force, but rather it is given to us by God insofar as he rives himself to us through all of the imprisonments of our existence." This gift of freedom is actualized by "going through" reality as it is, within the confines of our various imprisonments.
Darkness describes two realities: the confusion of suffering our imprisonments, and the miasma of suffering on a wider, universal scale. I would argue that AIDS, for example, is a form of suffering that sends waves of physical, emotional, and spiritual suffering throughout whole continents. But there is also the darkness of anguish, of confronting the truth about ourselves, of coming up against the imprisonments of our lives, and facing full throttle the complex of our moral, physical, and spiritual selves in relation to others and to God. The experience of truth can be, ironically, the darkness of confusion because what one sees is how perplexing life is, an admixture of great goodness of desire and incalculable failure and loss, mixed with a sense of unforgiving fate. The person who receives an AIDS diagnosis knows full well the meaning of darkness in this sense. This darkness is part of the human condition in general; as a part of human reality, it is ignored at our own peril.
Sin To be imprisoned is to be subject to the sin of the world. In Rahnerian doctrine, original sin denotes the historical entanglement in guilt which helps shape the actualization of freedom by human persons, individually and socially. 20 This entanglement in guilt is, as it were, passed on from one generation to the next as a permanent existential of the human condition within history. It is ratified in our own personal histories of sin in counterpoint to grace. 21 This freedom is exercised within the concrete, categorical dimension of existence when we realize our identity as unique spiritual persons in relation to others. Successive acts of freedom help determine the final state of our Uves, for which each is finally responsible, a responsibility nevertheless held in the ambit of God's mercy. Yet we cannot actualize this freedom in an absolutely unhindered way, as though we were monads in self-possession of utterly pure, abstracted natures. The actualization of our freedom takes place within a set of historical and even determining factors and in mutual relationship with other persons and their limitations. We co-determine one another, not only in freedom, but also in our sinfulness. The actualization of human freedom is then co-determined by what Rahner termed the "guilt" of the world, the ontic burden of sin, a mutually shared history of guilt.
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Family life can offer a helpful illustration of this co-determination by guilt. A family tree can be as much a picture of entanglement in guilt as it is a diagram of life. As we develop a unique identity within a family, we gradually differentiate ourselves from the others and discover our own personality and vocation. But this discovery is not the result of an autonomous act of self-development. We are shaped by our home environment, including its moral deficits, as well as by our peers, churches, schools, media, and numerous other factors. We do not emerge as unique persons in abstraction from the concrete conditions and the ideals and histories of the other people with whom we must interact, nor in abstraction from their guilt. Our lives bear the stamp of the history of other persons. 23 Rahner elaborated: "All of human experience points in the direction that there are in fact objectifications of personal guilt in the world which, as the material for the free decisions of other persons, threaten these decisions, have a seductive effect upon them, and make free decisions painful." 2 Thus, "even a person's most ideal, most moral act of freedom enters tragically into the concrete in an appearance which, because co-determined by guilt, is also the appearance of its opposite." 25 Any consideration of the human predicament has to take into account the reality of sin and the incongruous ratifications of it in our freedom. perplexing state within which that exercise takes place there is a path to freedom. The actualization of freedom can result in either an objectification of grace or an objectification of guilt and more usually some admixture of both. Just as grace meets and transfigures the darkness of life, making room for patterns of goodness, so guilt in many subtle ways co-determines under grace the good acts of a good person. "[T]he good act itself always remains ambiguous because of the codetermination of this situation by guilt. It always remains burdened with consequences which could not really be intended because they lead to tragic impasses, and which disguise the good that was intended by one's own freedom." 26 What one intends as a gesture of love could turn out to be an act of selfish domination, an act "lured on" by cupidity, to borrow a phrase from Bernard of Clairvaux. 27 Conversely, even the experience of grace is not without ambiguity within the contours of what Paul terms "the flesh".
Ambiguity

It would be a mistake to interpret this co-determination in guilt as
Christian pessimism, therefore, offers a theological context for embracing the sorrow of AIDS: it is utterly realistic about the darkness of life's imprisonments, it presumes our entanglement in the sin of the world and our mystifying ratifications of it, and it acknowledges the moral and existential ambiguity of the human condition, the admixture of guilt and grace, out of which AIDS has emerged. But Christian pessimism also implies a theology of hope, a hope one discovers, as It is one of Bernard's names for love and emphasizes that the natural origin of love for God is a proper self-love coordinate with our creatureliness. Stiegman comments: "Readers accustomed to Saint Augustine's more ordinary use of cupiditas as the self-love {amor sui) or pride which is the root of all sin must take special note of this. Bernard is more optimistic than Augustine in the manner in which he emphasizes and dwells upon that side of concupiscence which opens onto grace" (ibid. 149). Bernard's phenomenology of love, planted as it is in a well-developed theological anthropology, could be enlisted in a fresh appraisal of the relationship between sin, grace, and concupiscence, especially in light of contemporary understandings of human sexuality. anoints this existence with the divine self-gift. God promises to be "my good" or "our good." The horizon of hope is thus the mysterious God who is the beginning and end of human existence and encompasses all human existence in divine providence.
Hope, however, is not merely a matter of deciding to turn ourselves over, through some hybristic spiritual act, to the infinite context of our lives, thus being spared the real pains and sorrows of this earthly existence. For although hope is, in a transcendental sense, the goal of our freedom, we know it precisely only within the categorical experiences of darkness. We gain a deeper sense of hope as we see earthly realities more and more as provisional, passing, and incomprehensible. 28 Hope as a theological virtue, i.e. a habitual bearing toward God given by God and revealing of God, becomes a reality in direct proportion to our acceptance of the ultimate incomprehensibility of existence. 29 Thus, the Christian cannot deny the sting of suffering and death in the name of hope. The Christian is baptized into hope because baptized into Christ's death (Romans 6:3). Reality pushes toward the truth of its brutal end. A facile optimism about life and what we can accomplish within it "is excluded by the Christian conviction that we arrive at God's definitive realm only by passing through death."
30 All of life's perplexity is finally confronted by the perplexity of death itself, that "radical fall into the abyss of divinity" which is "the experience of the arrival of God." 31 Finally, then, both the radical realism of Christian pessimism and the hope toward which it points push us toward God.
As John of the Cross suggested, those who have everything taken from them, through death, tragedy, calamity, or spiritual trial, are ironically those who even in their darkness can finally find themselves most secure in God. 32 In the darkness of existence, one reaches the threshold either of hope or despair-two experiences which are intrinsically related in their dancing on the precipice of hopelessness.
33 How does the Christian escape despair and find hope in the darkness of suffering and death? For Rahner, it is a matter of grace, "the coexistential of pessimism" communicated by God to the human person. 34 But it also involves a person's active submission, in a kind of obedience, to this grace, precisely by embracing what is awful. For grace often comes unexpectedly in darkness, and often it is only the 28 "Utopia and Reality" 142. 29 darkness that one sees. How many people would immediately see grace in the suffering of a loved one from AIDS, or would embrace its reality without dread? There is a seemingly natural tendency to pull back from darkness, to avoid the darkness and thus the grace which is, as it were, forced upon us by the trials of life. 35 For Rahner, however, the Christian posture toward reality is to face reality and try to acknowledge it as it is, not in a position of fatalism, but in an active surrender which is at the same time an acceptance of God's dark grace. Rahner here wrote of "falling into the abyss of God's incomprehensibility. "
36 At this point systematic theology folds into its source, the experience of God.
In Rahner's theology of death, this falling into the divine abyss in hope is the way in which Christians can face death, in a blessed resignation marked with normal human fear and anxiety, but also with trust in the ever greater God. 37 We can learn much about Christian hope, in fact, by thoroughly contemplating death, as Rahner urged. For Rahner, as for Heidegger, death is not limited to the physical demise and climax of organic human life. Rather, it is a permanent existential of the human situation. We are beings-toward-death from the moment of our conception. We are, in fact, dying by installments throughout the time that binds our lives.
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Nevertheless, death ordinarily comes to us against our wills. There is an active force to death which we cannot escape and must finally accept. At the same time, Rahner suggested, Christians can, through an active faith, imagine dying as a gradual handling over of oneself to God with ever increasing desire and willingness. There is not only a passive dimension to death, in which death is, as it were, imposed upon us, but also an active dimension in which we dispossess ourselves and let ourselves fall into the abyss of death willingly as the final defining act of our lives. 39 For Rahner, an "active consummation" of life characterizes a precisely Christian death. 40 As the shifting boundaries of earthly life gradually dissolve through the organic processes of dying, so this surrender can bring us to a profound "yes" to God. If it does, the moments of dying become the moments when God accepts us in a final way. These moments are not limited strictly to the deathbed itself or to the final breath. That particular temporal occasion is only the em- phatic end of a reality that actually stretches over our life-time and comes into dramatic focus in the suffering of life that leads to death. The narrative of Jesus enters the picture at this point. It is not accidental but essential to Christian self-understanding that the cross of Christ should stand as the central symbol of faith. The cross provides a stark reminder that the human condition is entwined in the sin of the world and points to inherent ambiguity as the locus of human guilt and divine mercy. It not only reminds us of the harsh and dark realities of life, but also that we cannot evade them in the name of religion or compassion. Quite the opposite. The cross of Christ says that death is not simply a part of the future, but it is the future, pressing upon us now as surely as the force of gravity that holds us fast to earth.
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But the cross represents not only our facing life's darkness but our embracing the darkness as the place where the God of hope will be encountered. Rahner wrote stirringly that "Christianity is the religion which recognizes a man who was nailed to a cross and on it died a violent death as a sign of victory and as a realistic expression of human life." 42 Thus, the cross is properly the central symbol of Christian faith. 43 On the cross Jesus finally surrenders himself to the abyss of darkness threatened by creaturely nothingness, his falling into a void which was at the same time a release into the mystery of God. This release is the graced destiny of all of us, though one made terrifyingly dark by the involvement of sin in our physical demise. The cross of Jesus is therefore a symbol of the intrinsic connection between the sin of the world and death, but it also stands at the threshold of hope.
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What makes Rahner's theology of the cross even more distinctive is that the meaning of the cross as a path to hope is anchored not only in the agonies of Jesus' own passion, but even in the promise of his life at his birth. "We should notice here," Rahner wrote, "that He came into the world the same way we did in order to come to terms with the pre-given facts of human existence, and to begin to die." 45 As birth is tied to death, the Incarnation is intrinsically tied to the death of Jesus. This parallels and even roots Rahner's understanding of death as an ongoing and active process of surrender to God, from birth through expiration, rather than as a simple clinical event. Rahner One arrives finally at a stance within existence that is anchored in and redeemed by hope: a surrender of everything through dying to God, even from the earliest stirrings of a human life. For a Christian "believes that everything positive and beautiful and everything which blossoms has to pass through what we call death." 47 This stance is consistent with a quiet joy in life and a love for life that in no way denies the bleak landscapes of human existence but opens life to the future of God. Death, even death from AIDS, is not merely the necessary experience of submission to an inevitable clinical demise. From a theological point of view, precisely as a dying, it can also be seen as an active surrender to the God of hope after the pattern of Jesus.
48 "We come from a beginning we did not choose and go to an end that is lost in God.... We never know with ultimate certitude how we relate with our freedom to the inescapable situation of our existence; we have to accept our beginning, give our ultimate love to the end we call God, and with hope leave whether or not we do it in God's hands." 49 As ongoing surrender to God dying is consistent with the turn toward the eschatological horizon of hope that characterizes Rahner's Christian pessimism.
THE PLACE OF GOD
If Christian pessimism is to contextualize Christian hope in the midst of darkness, we must take up a further question about the place of God in this dark reality. The degree to which we implicate God in the darkness of this world (or, for that matter, in its goodness) is a classic problem. John Hick formulates the problem as follows: "If God is perfectly good, He must want to abolish all evil; if He is unlimitedly powerful, he must be able to abolish all evil: but evil exists; therefore either God is not perfectly good or He is not unlimitedly powerful." 50 To distinguish authentic Christian hope from facile optimism or from delusion, the God in whom we hope needs to be a God perfectly good, unlimitedly powerful, and not the cause of darkness. 46 Rahner treated this classic problem in his essay "Why Does God Allow Us to Suffer?" Here he argued that the attempt to answer why God allows us to suffer can tell us something important about God. While Christian faith cannot hold that a good and all-powerful God directly induces human suffering, it does maintain God's absolute sovereignty in freedom and power. We reach a point at which it is impossible for us to sustain the classical distinctions between what God ordains by permission and what God permits through indirect causality. In trying to comprehend the meaning of AIDS neither of the classical positions, permission of evil or indirect causality of it, is adequate. To argue that God permits the disease in order, for example, to draw the sufferer closer is to make claims about the divine prerogatives beyond human competence. To argue that God has indirectly caused the suffering of disease could lead one to conclude that the disease is some kind of divine judgment. Both classical views search for a moral or metaphysical calculus to elevate disease to a metaphysical state, as well as to limit the freedom and omnipotence of God, thereby diminishing God's mystery.
Rahner preferred the term "allow" in order to suggest a position that avoids such a conundrum: "Having regard to God's omnipotent freedom, which knows no bounds, causing and permitting seem to us to come so closely together that we can ask quite simply why God allows us to suffer, without having to distinguish a priori in this 'allowing' between God permitting and causing." 51 In the case of the sufferings brought on by nature (e.g. earthquakes) or involving the processes of nature (e.g. disease), Rahner admitted the validity of the distinction between God's "permitting" suffering and God's "causing" suffering, but he opted for saying that God "allows" such suffering because that term does not make the traditional distinctions, for instance, between permitting and causing which have led to metaphysical impasses. In this position on God's relation to physical evil, Rahner goes beyond Jacques Maritain who used the term "admit" to describe a position lying somewhere in the middle of the classical distinction between God's permitting and God's indirectly causing suffering. Maritain wrote:
Evil of nature, or suffering, is the object neither of a permission nor of a will properly so called of God-let us say rather that it is admitted by God, in this sense that from the very fact that God wills and causes, as transcendent first Cause, the good of the material universe and of the things of this universe, He causes at the same stroke, but indirectly and per accidens or in an extraintentional manner, the losses and evils linked inevitably and by nature to the goods and to the gains in question (no generation without corruption, no life without some destruction, nor any passage to a superior form of life without some death .. .).
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In Maritain's position, therefore, God is implicated albeit indirectly. Rahner's "God allows" tried to avoid this conclusion since the lines between physical and metaphysical causality are so tenuously drawn.
To press this further, Christian pessimism principally addresses suffering brought on by the ambiguity of our moral state. Some diseasesnotably AIDS, but also various venereal diseases, some forms of hepatitis, and possibly even lung cancer-reflect this ambiguity in that they involve both the physical and moral domains; they are diseases usually brought on in part as a result of acts involving the exercise of some degree of human freedom, although this degree varies widely from one person to another. Still, the claim is often made that because human freedom is involved at all, the physical and spiritual suffering of AIDS is "self-earned" and, further, ordained by God as a kind of judgment for sin. In dealing with such arguments, Rahner refrained from judging and preferred to say that God allows such suffering. 53 Although the conditions for the possibility of sin are given with the divine gift of freedom, and sin is often intertwined with physical suffering, there is no way by which moral evil, much less the physical consequences so intimately connected with human sinfulness, can be said to be caused by God, even indirectly. According to Rahner, "sin arising from creaturely freedom (which is never absolute) is itself by its very nature interwoven in an indissoluble and undelimitable way with other suffering." 54 While we can perceive sin as the ontological foundation of suffering, we certainly cannot say that sin is caused by God, even indirectly, any more than God could have caused the sinfulness that led to the suffering of Jesus' crucifixion. For Rahner, the physical consequences of the moral perplexity that eventuates in sin cannot be said to be caused by God but only allowed. God creates only the conditions for the possibilities of sin and its effects by creating everything in freedom. By creating all things in freedom, God allows for contingencies which could only be disallowed by removing freedom. In general, then, Rahner avoided the language of causality (that sin leads to suffering, or, by implication, that suffering is the consequence of sin and the experience of divine judgment) in order to stress that God is responsible for the whole of creation in freedom, a claim which includes not only the possibility of evil and suffering, apparent and real, natural and moral, but also the possibility of grace given and received in the heart of sin and suffering.
What Augustine through Aquinas would conclude that God, as the absolutely sovereign and free source of all that exists, is the one for whom all eventualities within freedom are given as possible, and who can draw good out of all possibilities, even the bleakest, "if only we are willing."
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This solution, however, does not make suffering comprehensible either as consequence of sin or as divine judgment. It is still encountered as a surd, a stumbling block to comprehensive schemes of meaning. The question "Why does God allow us to suffer?" looks for an answer found partly outside God in a moral or metaphysical calculus, a theodicy. While Rahner did not reject this classical approach, he did note that it does not finally explain why God allows suffering, but only how it can be said that God allows it. He held that all that can be said with certainty is that God has created all things in freedom to allow for their optimal good, as well as the good of the whole of creation, and that in that freedom God allows the darkness of evil, of which suffering and death are the primary examples. Beyond this, we have to admit in the last analysis that the question is unanswerable because suffering is ultimately incomprehensible. Pushing the question "Why does God allow suffering?" even further probes into the reality and intentions of God who is incomprehensible. Thus Rahner concluded, "The incomprehensibility of suffering is part of the incomprehensibility of God." 5 The incomprehensibility of suffering is a limit experience that takes us to the edge of the incomprehensible God. This is not to say that we have here the reason for suffering-as if suffering had a reason-but simply to express that suffering leads us to the incomprehensible nature and freedom of God. 57 In the failure of a moral or metaphysical calculus to provide an explanation, suffering can lead to despair and ultimately in death to perdition. But as a limit experience that leads us to the edge of incomprehensibility, it can be the "beginning of redeemed finality in God."
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In the end, the question why God allows suffering will lead us to surrender in adoration to the God who is absolutely free in goodness and power, and who in that freedom and power submitted to suffering and death, to be revealed as the God who, in the victory of life, remains all in all (1 Corinthians 15:28). through the humanity of Christ, but that actual sharing is the expression of deeper and permanent mystery in the Godhead, the will-toshare, i.e., the will to be a companion." 65 For Rahner divine empathy is shown most definitively on the cross of Christ. 66 God sees fit that the suffering and dying of Jesus which marked his entire life become the revelation of divine empathy, and ultimately of God's answer to the perplexity of existence. 67 And I would argue that the cross is indispensable for a Christian confrontation of the sorrow of AIDS and its harvest of death. Darkness yields to hope because the sorrow of those who suffer this disaster is met by the sorrow of God. The Church counsels compassion not alongside its theology but in concert with it, because the empathy of God is itself revealed in the cross of Christ. This divine wül to share, to be a companion in suffering and dying, revealed in the empathy of the Incarnate God, ultimately grounds the Church's call to compassion for persons with AIDS.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Christian pessimism therefore describes a faith stance planted firmly in the dark reality of human existence. It is properly pessimistic because it boldly admits the reality, sinfulness, and ambiguity of life found in the entanglements of sin, suffering, and death that come to light in tragedy, while claiming there are no short-range answers to this darkness. It is properly a Christian pessimism because in the experience of darkness the Christian finds hope, not as an exit from suffering, but as something better, brought about with help from beyond oneself. This hope for something better brought about by divine empathy is revealed in the cross, the root of our hope.
And it is proper to speak of hope, because the cross is the symbol of the helping reach of God to humanity in the perplexity of darkness. The Christian is one who can say that God is for us and for our salvation within this darkness, because God has been revealed in Jesus as a God of empathy, a God who sorrows. While one cannot see the final outcome of existence, one's hope is real because God has been and can be really known in this darkness. This hope enlivens and emboldens the Christian along the way to find grounds for faith, active love, compassion, and joy.
Christian pessimism is a way of theologically framing the reality of AIDS and grounding the compassion the Church professes. Can one go further? Can one learn from the example of a Francis, who did not hold the leper at arm's length but kissed his wounds and let the leper free him? In the example of Francis one sees the penetration of another's world, and letting that world into one's own to the point of conversion. If a source of sorrow such as AIDS demands to be interpreted by theology, could the sorrow and even mystery of this disease itself in some way inform our theology, or perhaps our theologizing, if we were to allow it to do so? 68 The possibilities for theology are rich. AIDS as reality and as metaphor urges us to develop a theology that consciously serves the pastoral mission of the Church because systematics and spirituality emerge from the common ground of the real both seen and unseen. Such a theology will not rest content with grounding expressions for pastoral compassion while holding at arm's length the human reality that evoked these calls. Rather, it will invite a theologizing that asks human beings to be attentive to reality, reverential in the face of the truth that it discloses, intellectually reflective upon this truth, and prayerful, discerning, and loving in our response to the human condition it represents. It could require a revision of some cherished ways of framing theological approaches to sin, suffering, and death, as well as the experience of God in relation to the unfolding of human experience in our time (e.g. the transformation of sexual gestalte). This need has already become clear in the realm of moral the- 
